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Understanding commercial actors’ engagement in policy debates on proposed e-cigarette 
regulation in Scotland 
 
What this paper adds 
• A lack of research examining the diversity of commercial actors 
engaging in e-cigarette policy debates means little is known about 
their views on e-cigarette regulation. 
• The distinct (sometimes competing) interests of the different 
commercial actors informed their positions in e-cigarette regulation. 
• Our analysis highlights the variation among commercial actors, and 
the potential for collaboration and strategic distancing. 
• Using a mixed methods approach, our analysis provides important 
insights into industry engagement in early e-cigarette policy debates, 
enabling public health to develop more informed responses.  
 





There is growing concern about transnational tobacco corporations’ (TTCs) and other commercial 
actors’ involvement in e-cigarette policy development. Previous analyses suggest that TTCs used e-
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cigarette debates to demonstrate alignment with public health and re-gain policy influence. Less is 
known about the engagement of other types of commercial actors in e-cigarette policy debates. 
This paper is the first to empirically analyse commercial actors’ engagement in an e-cigarette policy 
consultation process and to examine their views on proposed regulation. It applies mixed methods, 
drawing on policy consultation submissions (n=32), semi-structured interviews (n=9) and a social 
network analysis of website links among 32 commercial actors. 
The results show that commercial actors’ positions on e-cigarette regulation aligned with business 
interests. TTCs, independent e-cigarette manufacturers and other non-licensed commercial actors 
were opposed to most aspects of potential e-cigarette regulation (except for age of sale restrictions), 
whereas licensed commercial actors, including pharmaceutical companies, supported more stringent 
regulation. While collaboration was viewed as strategically important to gain policy influence, 
distinct commercial interests and concerns about TTC credibility led to strategic distancing and to 
collaboration being largely confined to sector boundaries. In addition to reiterating arguments 
employed by TTCs in previous regulatory debates, commercial actors focused on highlighting the 
technical complexity and harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes.  
Awareness of the various commercial interests and strategic positioning of commercial actors in e-
cigarette policy should inform public health advocacy and policy development, including managing 






The regulation of e-cigarettes varies considerably in countries around the globe, with 100 
countries having national or federal laws regulating e-cigarettes and 30 countries banning the use of 
e-cigarettes [1].  Polarised views on e-cigarettes and their regulation hinge on: the relative harms 
compared to combustible cigarettes; their effectiveness for smoking cessation; potential to re-
normalise smoking; attractiveness to young people and those who have never smoked; role in 
sustaining nicotine addiction; and the potential for transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) to use 
e-cigarettes to regain credibility [2, 3]. While there is some consensus on the benefits of e-cigarettes 
for smokers who are able to switch completely to using them [4, 5], the other concerns persist and 
have informed some contentious debates [6-9].  
A variety of commercial actors engage in debates on e-cigarette regulation. Among these, 
TTCs have received particular attention because they have successfully prevented or weakened 
previous public health regulation [10, 11]. Tobacco companies argue that e-cigarettes represent 
‘reduced-risk products’ with the potential to wean smokers off combustible cigarettes [12, 13]. Yet, 
the interests and preferences of TTCs around e-cigarette regulation remain under-examined, and 
even less is known about other types of commercial actors.  
The development of The Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc. and Care) (Scotland) Act 2016 [14] 
(Box 1), which included two consultation exercises, provides an opportunity to examine 
commercial actors’ engagement in e-cigarette policy [15]. As one of the first pieces of regulation 
worldwide, the Act focused solely on e-cigarettes; it did not differentiate between specific next 
generation products and did not address heated tobacco products, oral tobacco products or other 
devices. In this paper, we draw on commercial actor submissions to two Scottish policy 
consultations (focusing on potential policy responses to e-cigarettes and vaping), stakeholder 
interviews and websites, to examine commercial sector interests in e-cigarette regulation. The 
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specific research questions focussed on commercial actors’ interests in, and positions on, the 
benefits, harms and regulation of e-cigarettes and commercial actors’ efforts to collaborate with 
each other and shape e-cigarette policy. This analysis is relevant to e-cigarette policy discussions 
internationally, since it provides insights into relationships between different types of commercial 
actors and interests. 
 
  
Box 1: Chronology of the development of the Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc. 
and Care) (Scotland) Act 2016 
(The formal opportunities for commercial actors to engage in the policy 
process appear in bold.) 
10 October 2014 Scottish Government (SG) launched a consultation on 
“Electronic cigarettes and Strengthening Tobacco 
Control in Scotland” [15]. 
October 2014 – 
April 2015 
Consultation opened for submissions. 
October 2014 – 
April 2015 
Meetings between Scottish Government and several 
political actors to consult on Scottish Government’s 
plans to adopt regulation of e-cigarettes. 
May 2015 Scottish Government released its report on the 
consultation on e-cigarettes and tobacco control in 
Scotland and its response to the consultation [16]. 





This study was part of a larger mixed methods project that combined: (i) documentary 
analysis of consultation responses, related websites, reports and briefings; (ii) network analysis of 
the weblinks among the actors who submitted consultation responses; and (iii) thematic analysis of 
semi-structured interviews with a sample of these actors[20]. We analysed the data relating to a sub-
4 June 2015 The Health (Tobacco, Nicotine, etc. & Care) (Scotland) 
Bill was introduced in the Scottish Parliament. 
Summer 2015 The Scottish Parliament’s (SP) Health & Sports 
Committee (designated lead parliamentary 
committee) consulted with a range of experts on the 
bill, including representatives from the commercial 
sector, third sector/civil society, e-cigarette user 
groups, local authorities and health professionals [17, 
18]. 
The Health & Sports Committee also engaged in a 
wider public consultation on restricting the sale of e-
cigarettes through the use of an online survey, 
Facebook, youth events and video blogs [17, 18].  
9 November 2015 The Health and Sports Committee published the Stage 1 
Report on Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc. and Care) 
(Scotland) Bill, demonstrating clear support for the Bill 
[19]. 
3 March 2016 The Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc. and Care) (Scotland) 
Act 2016 was passed in the Scottish Parliament [14]. 
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set of commercial actors (defined as organisations with a financial interest in the production and 
marketing of e-cigarettes).  
The study obtained ethical approval from the University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences 
Ethics Committee for Non-Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects (application number: 
400150145).    
Identification and categorisation of actors with commercial interests in e-cigarettes 
The larger project identified 121 organisations involved in the policy consultations, 32 of 
which had commercial interests. The classification of commercial actors, while challenging due to 
the dynamic nature of the market and the fact that relationships between organisations were not 
always clear [21], was undertaken according to the organisations’ distinct interests in e-cigarettes, 
which led us to identify five categories (Table 1). 
Table 1 here 
Documentary analysis 
The Scottish Government consultation process sought views on 21 policy proposals, 
covering the following areas: age of sale; advertising; retailing; and use in enclosed public spaces 
(Table 2). We analysed the 32 commercial actor submissions and related documentary data to 
determine key attributes for each organisation including: industry sector; geographical location; and 
public stance on each policy proposal. All data were numerically coded in an Excel spreadsheet.  
In-depth thematic analysis of free text within the commercial actor submissions was carried 
out using NVivo11. Double coding of 20 consultation responses was undertaken independently by 
two senior researchers to develop a coding framework, driven by the research questions. After 
discussion and agreement by the research team, all data were systematically coded by one 
researcher using this framework.  
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Social network analysis 
We used the webcrawling software IssueCrawler (a web network location and visualisation 
software that searches specified sites and captures links) to identify weblinks among the 
commercial actors who participated in the policy consultation processes, using these as proxies for 
publicly disclosed relationships. Webcrawling has been used to map the interconnections of 
individual blogs to highlight the value of the IssueCrawler tool to study patterns of interaction [22]. 
The advantage of using webcrawling, over manual searches of webpages, is that webcrawling is 
able to systematically search websites much more in-depth [23]. Webcrawling was undertaken 
June-July 2016, i.e. approximately one year after the consultations took place, shortly before the 
interviews were conducted. Weblinks among network actors were extracted up to three degrees of 
separation (‘three clicks away’) as this was the maximum crawl depth possible, taking into account 
the direction of the weblinks (see arrowhead direction in Figure 1). Manual webcrawling was 
carried out for websites (n=10) that were not accessible to IssueCrawler in order to identify any 
direct weblinks between these organisations and other network actors (limited to one degree of 
separation). Organisations without websites (n=2) were included in the data file as isolates. 
Network analysis was carried out in Visone [24], with each commercial actor represented as a node. 
The Girvan-Newman edge-betweenness community detection algorithm [25] was used to identify 
clusters.  
 The study’s webcrawling component is limited in two ways: first, weblinks only represent 
information about relationships that organisations are willing to disclose (in the public domain), and 
do not necessarily translate into operational interactions; second, webcrawling is necessarily 
undertaken at a particular point in time, yet organisational relationships are dynamic and may have 
differed subsequently. For these reasons, this paper focuses on the thematic analysis of the policy 
documents and stakeholder interviews. However, given one of the key concerns about commercial 
actor engagement in e-cigarette policy has been the potential for coalition-building and using third 
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parties to enable TTC policy influence [26], we used the network analysis of the webcrawling data 
to provide contextual insights into cross-organisational links which may not have been otherwise 
evident. Although webcrawling data are too massive to check manually [27] we did manually check 
a subset of the commercial actor websites (n=20) to better understand identified weblinks. This 
suggested that membership (e.g. being member of a trade body or umbrella organisation) and cross-
referencing (e.g. linking to other organisations to support particular claims) were frequent 
relationship types (i.e. that these links were meaningful).  
Interview data 
This paper also draws on nine interviews with commercial actors undertaken in October 
2016 - August 2017. Interviews explored commercial actors’ perspectives on the policy process and 
their reasons for engaging; views on the potential harms, benefits and regulation of e-cigarettes; 
commercial actors’ efforts to shape e-cigarette policy; and collaborate in the process. Interview 
guides were refined for each interview to explore issues raised in their respective organisational 
consultation submissions and relationships identified via the social network analysis. We used 
purposive sampling of commercial actors to achieve maximum variation regarding organisation 
type and policy positions [28] and approached individuals at management/director level. The 
overall response rate for commercial interviewees was 25%. The nine interviews undertaken 
involved four of the five categories of commercial actors (the advertising industry organisations we 
approached declined to participate – Table 1). Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
Transcripts were read and re-read by the team. A randomly chosen subset of the transcripts 
(n=3) was double-coded independently by two members of the research team, informed by the 
research questions, the documentary coding framework and new themes that emerged in the 
interviews [29]. Based on a discussion of this coding, a thematic coding frame was developed and 
the lead author then coded all transcripts using iterative comparisons. Coding-checking was 
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undertaken by the senior author by randomly picking codes and sections of text to assess coding 
consistency and comprehension.  
Findings 
Table 1 provides an overview of the key characteristics of the 32 commercial organisations. The e-
cigarette market has continued to evolve since our data collection and not all of the actors in our 
analysis remain active (e.g. the e-cigarette manufacturer, ROK, no longer appears to be trading and 
the Electronic Cigarette Industry Trade Association (ECITA) has been superseded by the UK 
Vaping Industry Association (UKVIA) and the Independent British Vape Trade Association 
(IBVTA)).  
Understanding commercial actors’ positions on regulating e-cigarettes  
Commercial actors varied in their positions on specific regulatory proposals (Table 2).  
Table 2 here 
Most commercial actors agreed on proposed regulation to limit the age of sale of e-cigarettes 
to 18 years (78% in support). The only organisation opposing such restrictions was the National 
Pharmacy Association, who argued that underage smokers should have access to e-cigarettes for 
smoking cessation purposes. Commercial actors were least supportive of banning the use of e-
cigarettes in public spaces (9% in support), arguing that ‘there is no consensus […] about whether 
there are risks to public health from second-hand vapour’ (Co-Operative Food, consultation), and 
that a ban would be ‘disproportionate’ (Totally Wicked, consultation). 
Proposals for restricting domestic advertising for e-cigarettes were supported by 38%. 
Claims that advertising was already being sufficiently controlled via self-regulation and socially 
responsible practices were commonly provided by TTC subsidiaries. For example, Blu (UK) 
claimed that existing self-regulation ensured that advertising would ‘not target underage persons or 
non-smokers but should be directed solely at adults who wish to use e-cigarettes in order to reduce 
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their consumption of tobacco’ (Blu (UK), consultation). Likewise, Nicoventures highlighted that 
the UK Committee of Advertising Practice and the UK Broadcast Committee of Advertising 
Practice had ‘introduced specific measures to protect young people and non-smokers from 
inappropriate e-cigarette advertising’, arguing that further regulation was  unnecessary 
(Nicoventures, consultation). Pharmaceutical companies, in contrast, argued that advertising should 
be regulated, but that licensed devices should be exempt to promote their use for smoking cessation. 
Many commercial actors (across sectors) employed harm reduction arguments to support 
their positions, but how they did so varied. Commercial actors with no licence to produce or market 
medicinal products drew on a claimed ‘general consensus among the medical community […] that 
electronic cigarettes offer significant potential public health benefits’ (Fontem Ventures, 
consultation) to support their arguments that e-cigarettes are more effective in overcoming addiction 
than NRT and less harmful than combustible cigarettes. Similarly, Totally Wicked (an independent 
e-cigarette retailer [30]) referenced a Public Health England report: ‘Electronic cigarettes are at 
least 95 times safer than tobacco cigarettes’ [31] (Totally Wicked, consultation). In contrast, actors 
representing pharmaceutical companies employed the same harm reduction narrative to argue for 
more stringent regulation of unlicensed products. These actors distinguished between licensed 
medicinal devices – which they argued were suited for smoking cessation – and unlicensed e-
cigarettes – which they portrayed as lifestyle products with potential to induce young people and 
never smokers to become addicted to nicotine.  
Collaboration and competition between commercial actors  
While the interview data suggest that collaborations were viewed as important to gain 
political influence, competing business interests and concerns about the negative reputation of 
TTCs appeared to hamper coalition-building in some cases. The weblink analysis identified three 
clusters and a few isolated peripheral organisations (Figure 1), visualising potential relationships 
that were then explored further via the interview data. 
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Figure 1 here 
 
 
Abbreviations: ECITA (Electronic Cigarette Industry Trade Association), FOREST (Freedom 
Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco), ITPAC (Imported Tobacco Products Advisory 
Council), NFRN (National Federation of Retail Newsagents) 
A                 B signals organisational website A include one or more weblink(s) to website B. 
 
Figure 1: Network analysis highlighting weblinks between organisations with a commercial 
interest, evident in the e-cigarette policy debate 
The first and largest cluster comprised of seven TTCs and affiliated organisations (including 
FOREST, an industry-funded smokers’ rights association), four retail/wholesale organisations not 
licensed to sell medicines and two independent e-cigarette companies. TTCs and their affiliates 
were densely linked with each other and with two retailers and wholesalers with a previous history 
of collaborating with TTCs (the Scottish Grocers’ Federation [32] and the Petrol Retailers 
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Association [33]). While Nicoventures, a stand-alone company established in 2011 by British 
American Tobacco, was part of this cluster, via a link to the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association (a 
trade group), the other TTC subsidiaries and brands were not. The two independent e-cigarette 
manufacturers were attached to the network via one link to ECITA, suggesting that they were more 
peripheral to the cluster and distanced from the TTCs and their affiliates. The subsequent 
disappearance of ECITA as the main e-cigarette trade body in the UK and the emergence of two 
independent umbrella organisations, UKVIA (which all the TTCs in our analysis are members of) 
and IBVTA (which focuses on independent e-cigarette companies, albeit with some overlap), 
further underlines this sense of strategic separation. 
A second, smaller but more densely connected cluster consisted of eight pharmaceutical 
actors and two, peripherally located representatives of the advertising industry. The high density of 
links between pharmaceutical actors suggests that this sector was highly connected. Moreover, the 
clear separation between pharmaceutical actors and both TTCs/TTC-affiliated organisations and 
independent e-cigarette manufacturers mirrors their contrasting positions on regulating e-cigarettes 
and was also reflected in the interview data. 
The third and smallest cluster consisted of three TTC e-cigarette subsidiaries and TTC-
owned e-cigarette brands, Fontem Ventures, Nicocigs Ltd and Cygnet UK Trading Ltd trading as 
Blu e-cigarettes, and a non-licensed retail organisation. The lack of weblinks between TTCs e-
cigarette subsidiaries and their parent companies (both ways) may be illustrative of strategic 
attempts to distance reduced-risk products from tobacco industry parent businesses. This was also 
evident in the interviews where  one interviewee who represented a TTC-owned e-cigarette 
subsidiary indicated that they wanted to be referred to as a representative of an e-cigarette 
manufacturer, not a tobacco industry representative.  
The interview data confirms the SNA findings that collaboration largely aligned with 
business interests and occurred within, rather than across, industry sectors. Collaboration was 
14	
	
important to enhance policy influence and align messages: ‘We would align wi’ the RPS [Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society], probably GP bodies as well… it would be a slightly stronger message 
from more than one body.’ (Pharmacy representative). However, the potential negative reputational 
consequences of being associated with TTCs resulted in reluctance to collaborate with TTCs by 
independent e-cigarette manufacturers and pharmacy sector representatives: We wouldn’t work with 
them [TTCs], that would be, reputationally for us, that would be damaging (Pharmacy 
representative). These concerns help explain the limited weblinks between TTCs and other 
commercial actors. 
Efforts to secure e-cigarette policy engagement in the context of concerns about FCTC Article 
5.3 
Actors representing TTCs and independent e-cigarette companies were concerned about being 
excluded from the policy process via FCTC Article 5.3, which protects public health policies from 
the commercial  interests of the tobacco industry [34]. They argued that involving e-cigarette 
manufacturers in policy processes did not contradict the FCTC: ‘Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is not intended to prevent the views of manufacturers of 
lawful products from being heard and properly taken into account.’ (JTI, consultation). Instead, 
engagement was highlighted as important to ensure accountability: ‘The policy makers should have 
to meet with the industry representation… That’s essential, that policy makers are held to account 
and […] get a view on what they’re actually making a policy for.’ (Independent e-cigarette industry 
representative). Yet, TTCs perceived public health actors as reluctant to engage with them: ‘I think 
the issue is the public health community […] isn't accustomed to the idea of a public health problem 
like smoking being solved by commercial actors.’ (TTC representative).  
TTC representatives emphasised that e-cigarettes were not tobacco products, claimed the 
FCTC did not apply to e-cigarettes and argued there was no basis for any exclusion of e-cigarette 
manufacturers. Claims about the technical complexity of e-cigarettes (compared to combustible 
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cigarettes) were used to underline the case for engaging with product manufacturers. This mirrors 
arguments TTCs have previously employed to influence regulation [35]. 
While pharmaceutical actors also commented on the need for commercial sector inclusion in 
policy debates, they were less vocal on this subject: “I think it’s important that all of the 
stakeholders have the opportunity to share their views... it’s for the policy makers to seek out the 
range of views,	but also understand the basis upon which each organisation is presenting its view” 
(Pharmaceutical industry representative). These actors seemed less concerned about experiencing 
exclusion themselves and made fewer references to Article 5.3. 
Discussion 
This study is the first empirical analysis of commercial actors’ views on, and engagement in, the 
development of e-cigarette regulation. The Scottish case illustrates that commercial actors’ business 
interests determined their positions on e-cigarette regulation. While the interests of TTCs, e-
cigarette companies, retailers without a licence to sell medicines and advertisers overlapped, leading 
to considerable opposition to many regulatory proposals, pharmaceutical organisations were 
supportive of more stringent regulation, following their interest to protect their revenue from the 
sale of NRT and licensed products. The identification of clear differences in the interests and 
positions of commercial actors engaging in e-cigarette policy debates underlines the importance of 
not treating commercial actors as a monolith.  Indeed, we found variations even within the five 
commercial actor categories we identified. 
 
Our analysis identifies two strategies and five common arguments used by commercial 
actors to influence e-cigarette policy. Our findings confirm previous tobacco industry research on 
the industry’s political activity, taxation, and marketing policies [11]. Like our paper, Ulucanlar and 
colleagues distinguish between “discursive” (argument-based) and “instrumental” (action-based) 
16	
	
industry strategies. Our findings show that these industry strategies are not only used by TTC 
actors, but also by a broader range of commercial actors. 
The first commercial actor strategy we identified combines strategic collaboration with 
strategic distancing. In line with previous TTC attempts to form alliances with others [10, 11], 
commercial actors viewed collaboration as an important means of enhancing their ‘voice’ in policy 
debates. Yet, decisions about strategic collaboration were hampered by commercial actors‘ 
contrasting policy positions and the controversy around TTCs. Independent e-cigarette 
manufacturers seemed wary about collaborating with manufacturers of combustible cigarettes, 
despite having overlapping policy interests, as they noted TTCs’ low credibility. Pharmaceutical 
actors occupied their ‘own space’ (illustrated in the network analysis) and positioned themselves as 
healthcare actors. Their intentions in doing so were to emphasise the importance of securing a 
medicinal licence for e-cigarettes (while protecting NRT revenue) and maintaining their positive 
image as supporters of public health policy (despite having distinct commercial interests) [26]. This 
shows that TTCs continue to struggle in their efforts to overcome political isolation [36]. It also 
highlights that the positioning of commercial actors in policy debates is influenced by broader, 
strategic goals and that, while arguments might differ, commercial actors’ primary interest remains 
economic rather than health. It is therefore important for policymakers not to focus overly on visible 
links between commercial organisations or on specific arguments in policy debates, but to 
understand how policy preferences relate to wide-ranging commercial interests.  
The second strategy, specific to TTCs and confirming previous work on strategic reputation 
management [11], was to maintain a sense of separation from their e-cigarette subsidiaries in public 
domains. This strategy was employed even though TTCs had firmly established their presence in 
the e-cigarette market prior to the Scottish consultation [37], with Imperial Tobacco setting up 
Fontem Ventures in February 2013, and Philip Morris International acquiring Nicocigs in June 
2014 [38-40]. In the context of low policy credibility, TTCs attempted to separate e-cigarettes from 
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their tobacco industry parent business in order to avoid tarnishing the image of e-cigarettes. Our 
findings confirm previous research which identified a TTC strategy of buying up independent e-
cigarette companies to increase policy influence and credibility [21].  
We identified five arguments that commercial actors employed to influence e-cigarette 
policy, mirroring arguments that TTCs have successfully employed previously to counter public 
health policy. First, commercial actors involved in the manufacturing and retail of e-cigarettes 
claimed that the complexity of e-cigarettes required their expertise and involvement in policy 
discussions [35]. Second, most commercial actors positioned e-cigarettes as harm reduction 
products to help smokers quit. While this argument has been employed previously [41], we found 
differences between TTCs and other commercial actors. Third, except for pharmaceutical 
organisations, commercial actors argued that existing regulation was sufficient, using examples of 
self-regulation to reinforce this claim and reiterating arguments that legislation is unnecessary and 
disproportionate, which have been used widely by TTCs [10, 11]. Fourth, mirroring TTCs’ 
inequality frames promoted in the context of tobacco policy [11] , TTCs and their affiliates argued 
that the regulation of e-cigarettes would unfairly affect smokers and have unintended public health 
costs by depriving smokers of effective quit aids. Finally, TTCs, TTC-affiliated organisations and 
independent e-cigarette companies employed two arguments seeking to reject claims that FCTC 
Article 5.3 requires their exclusion from policy debates: (i) Article 5.3 does not apply since e-
cigarettes are not a tobacco product and can support public health goals [42]; and (ii) stakeholder 
engagement is a democratic right [43].   
Many of the arguments employed by commercial actors in the context of Scottish e-cigarette 
regulation strongly resemble well-known TTC arguments [10]. This highlights the need for 
policymakers to be aware of TTCs attempts to promote old arguments despite arguing that they are 
transforming their business and working towards a smoke-free future [44]. TTCs employed e-
cigarettes as a deliberate strategy to undermine FCTC provisions and tobacco control, while trying 
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to re-build their credibility and influence via the promotion of reduced-risk products [7, 21, 37]. 
Strategies and arguments did not differ much between commercial actors, and were used to promote 
and protect their respective business interests. 
Conclusions 
Our paper provides an account of commercial actor involvement in the early years of e-cigarette 
regulation in a specific setting and the market has continued to evolve since our data collection. 
However, since the UK was one of the first countries to introduce e-cigarette regulation, and since 
many of the commercial actors we analysed operate internationally, our analysis should help to 
inform those seeking to understand commercial sector interests in e-cigarette regulation elsewhere. 
Specifically, it provides useful insights into the variation among commercial actors, and the 
potential for both collaboration and strategic distancing. The implementation of Article 5.3 is likely 
to be insufficient for ensuring e-cigarette policy development is protected from the broad array of 
such interests [45]. Instead, specific guidance on managing conflicts of interest within e-cigarette 
policy may be required.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Classification of commercial actors engaged in the Scottish policy debate on e-cigarette regulation, their responses to the Scottish 
Government consultation, and average support for policy proposals 
Categories of 
industry sectors 


















are either TTCs, 
owned by TTCs or 
had other direct 





- Japan Tobacco International 
(JTI,https://www.jti.com/) 
- Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG, 
https://www.imperialbrandsplc.com)  
- Fontem Ventures (ITG, 
https://www.imperialbrandsplc.com/about-
us/our-companies/fontem-ventures.html) 
- Philip Morris Int. Ltd (PMI, 
https://www.pmi.com/) 
- Nicocigs Ltd (PMI, 
https://www.nicolites.com/) 




- Imported Tobacco Products Advisory 
Council (ITPAC, no website found) 
- Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association (TMA, 
http://the-tma.org.uk/)  
Consultation 








- Cygnet UK Trading Ltd t/a blu eCigs (UK) 
(https://www.blu.com/en/GB) 
- ECITA (EU) Ltd (http://www.ecita.org.uk/) 




companies with no 




are not owned by 
TTCs 
UK: 
- Totally Wicked Ltd 
(https://www.totallywicked-eliquid.co.uk/) 
- ROK Premium e-cigarettes 
(www.rokuniversal.co.uk) 
- Vaporized, now VPZ (	https://vpz.co.uk/) 
Consultation 



















which are either 
licensed to make 
or sell medical 
products or 
represent those 
licensed to sell 
medical products 
Transnational: 
- Johnson and Johnson UK Ltd ( 
https://www.jnj.com/) 
- Pfizer UK (http://www.pfizer.co.uk/) 
 
UK: 
- Boots UK (https://www.boots-uk.com/) 
- L Rowland and Co. Ltd ( 
https://www.rowlandspharmacy.co.uk/) 
- National Pharmacy Association ( 
https://www.npa.co.uk/) 
- Company Chemists’ Association ( 
https://thecca.org.uk/) 
- General Pharmaceutical Council ( 
https://www.pharmacyregulation.org/) 








responses: n= 9 
Interviewees: 
n=4 






- National Federation of Retail Newsagents 
Consultation 
responses: n= 6 
72% (n=15) 44% (n=7) 
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an interest in selling 







which are not 
licensed to make 
or sell medical 
products 
UK: 
- National Federation of Retail Newsagents 
(NFRN,  https://thefedonline.com/) 
- Petrol Retailers Association (PRA) ( 
https://www.ukpra.co.uk/)  
- Co-operative Food Group ( 
https://www.coop.co.uk/) 




- Scottish Grocers Federation (SGF,  
https://www.sgfscot.co.uk/) 
- Scottish Wholesale Association (SWA,  
https://www.scottishwholesale.co.uk/) 
Consultation 
responses: n= 6 
Interviewees: 
n=1 













- Advertising Association ( 
https://www.adassoc.org.uk/) 
- Institute of Practitioners in Advertising ( 
https://ipa.co.uk/) 
- Advertising Standards Authority ( 
https://www.asa.org.uk/) 
Consultation 
responses: n= 3 
Interviewees: 
n=0 




Table 2 Commercial actor overall response rate and support for each e-cigarette policy proposal suggested in the policy consultation process. 
Support by actor category2 Proposed regulation 
Response 
rate1 
% of actors 
agreeing with 
the proposal 


































Regulatory proposals relating to Age of Sale 
(AoS)   
     
The minimum AoS for e-cigarettes should be 
set at 18. 81% (n=26) 78% (n=25) 82% (n=9) 100% (n=3) 78% (n=7) 100% (n=6) 0% (n=0) 
AoS regulation should apply to all products, not 
just those containing nicotine. 63% (n=20) 59% (n=19) 73% (n=8) 67% (n=2) 67% (n=6) 50% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 
AoS regulation offence should apply to both 
retailer and purchaser. 56% (n=18) 31% (n=10) 27% (n=3) 33% (n=1) 33% (n=3) 50% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 
Sales of e-cigarette devices and refills from self-
service vending machines should be banned. 72% (n=23) 50% (n=16) 27% (n=3) 67% (n=2) 78% (n=7) 67% (n=4) 0% (n=0) 
AoS restrictions should also apply to e-cigarette 
accessories. 56% (n=18) 22% (n=7) 9% (n=1) 33% (n=1) 44% (n=4) 17% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 
It should be an offence to proxy purchase e-
cigarettes. 72% (n=23) 69% (n=22) 73% (n=8) 100% (n=3) 56% (n=5) 100% (n=6) 0% (n=0) 
There should be an age verification policy 
‘Challenge 25’. 75% (n=24) 50% (n=16) 64% (n=7) 67% (n=2) 33% (n=3) 67% (n=4) 0% (n=0) 
Penalties for selling e-cigarettes to under-18s 
should be the same as for tobacco. 63% (n=20) 31% (n=10) 36% (n=4) 33% (n=1) 22% (n=2) 50% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 
Regulatory proposals relating to e-cigarette advertising 




Regulation of advertising of e-cigarettes should 
be in addition to that introduced by the EU 
Tobacco Products Directive. 
75% (n=24) 22% (n=7) 18% (n=2) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Billboard advertising should be banned. 59% (n=19) 19% (n=6) 9% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Leafletting should be banned. 59% (n=19) 19% (n=6) 9% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Brand stretching should be banned. 63% (n=20) 22% (n=7) 18% (n=2) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Free distribution of e-cigarettes should be 
banned. 66% (n=21) 19% (n=6) 9% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Nominal pricing for e-cigarettes should be 
banned. 63% (n=20) 19% (n=6) 9% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Point of sales advertising should be banned. 63% (n=20) 19% (n=6) 9% (n=1) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Events sponsorship should be banned. 63% (n=20) 22% (n=7) 18% (n=2) 0% (n=0) 56% (n=5) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
Regulatory proposals relating to e-cigarette retailers 
There should be a Scottish Retailer Register for 
e-cigarette devices and refills. 72% (n=23) 28% (n=9) 27% (n=3) 33% (n=1) 22% (n=2) 50% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 
The offences and penalties should reflect those 
already in place for the Scottish Tobacco 
Retailers Register. 
66% (n=21) 31% (n=10) 27% (n=3) 33% (n=1) 33% (n=3) 50% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 
Sales of e-cigarettes by those under 18 should 
be prohibited. 75% (n=24) 22% (n=7) 36% (n=4) 0% (n=0) 11% (n=1) 33% (n=2) 0% (n=0) 
Regulatory proposals relating to use of e-cigarettes in public places 
Use of e-cigarettes in enclosed public spaces 
should be banned. 63% (n=20) 9% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 33% (n=3) 0% (n=0) 0% (n=0) 
1 Response rate = percentage/number of actors that expressed a view either in support of or opposition to the proposed regulation. Balance represents missing 
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